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STUDENT NOTES
Eminent Domain: Approaches to Valuation of Real Estate
With Emphasis on Mineral Properties
[NIor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Private
property shall not be taken or damaged for public use,
without just compensation... and when private property
shall be taken, or damaged, for public use ... the com-
pensation to the owner shall be ascertained in such man-
ner, as may be prescribed by general law .... W. VA.
CONST. art. 3, § 9 [emphasis added].
INTRODUCTION
Acquisition of private property for public use has increased
rapidly in the United States in recent years. Highway construction,
low-rent housing, reservoirs, and airports are among the more
common government projects which require large segments of
privately-owned real estate. Construction of four-lane highways,
especially in West Virginia at the present time, is undoubtedly the
major cause of increased eminent domain litigation.
Unfortunately, few lawyers are prepared to handle this type of
litigation. The small number of lawyers adequately prepared to try
condemnation cases are usually specialists employed by the state
or federal government. The purpose of the first part of this paper
is to narrow the gap between government specialists and practicing
trial lawyers by providing an up-to-date compilation of cases dealing
with approved approaches to value determination. The second part
of this paper will consist of a discussion of the present condemnation
law pertaining to mineral properties, and a proposal for a change
in that law.
An understanding of condemnation procedure is just as im-
portant as an understanding of the different approaches to value;
however, a detailed study of condemnation procedure is outside
the scope of this note. In any event, it is not too difficult to
gain a workable knowledge of procedural law because most states,
including West Virginia, have enacted extensive legislation covering
condemnation procedure.'
1 Basically, condemnation procedure in West Virginia involves the selec-
tion of a panel of five commissioners who determine just compensation in
1
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Substantive law pertaining to value determination, on the other
hand, is not so accessible. The West Virginia constitution expressly
provides that compensation to the owner is determined by general
law. Since federal and state constitutions only offer broad guidance,
and since statutes relating to value determination are virtually
nonexistent, a knowledge of judicially acceptable approaches to
value determination can only be gained by a painstaking study of
case decisions dealing with the subject.
I. APPROACHES TO VALUE DETERMINATION
Court development of the basic principles of just compensation
has centered around the "res" concept and the judicial balancing
of loss to the condemnee against public need for limitation in the
amount of the awards.' In Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United
States,3 the landmark "res" concept case, the Supreme Court said:
"[Jfust compensation . . . is for the property, and not to the
owner .... ." Compensation relates to the physical object, not
damage to the person in relation to the object.' In a later decision,
an informal proceeding, unless the commissioners' hearing is waived by the
parties in favor of an immediate jury trial. Even if there is a commissioners'
hearing either party can file exceptions to the commissioners' report within
ten days and be assured of a jury trial. W. Va. CODE ch. 54, art. 2 (Michie
1966).
The commissioners or jury must make one lump sum award for the pro-
perty taken, irrespective of divided ownership or variance of interests and
estates. Charleston & Southside Bridge Co. v. Comstock, 36 W. Va. 263, 15
S.E. 69 (1892). Th value of the property cannot be enhanced by any distri-
bution of the title or estate among different persons, or by contract arrange-
ments among the owners of different interests. Any advantage secured to one
interest must be taken from another - the sum of all the parts cannot ex-
ceed the whole. 4 P. NicHoLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.36(1) (rev. 3d ed.
1971). In West Virginia, when divided ownership or various estates or inter-
ests exist, the court may act on its own or appoint a special commissioner to
conduct a hearing and ascertain the persons entitled to compensation. W.
VA. CODE ch. 54, art. 2, § 18 (Michie 1966). After the total award has been
ascertained and the money has been paid into court, the condemnor has no
further interest in the proceedings. See generally CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCA-
TION PROGRAM OF THE WEST VIRGINIA STATE BAR AND THE WEST VIRGINIA
UNIVERSrTY COLLEGE OF LAw, EMINENT DOMAIN LAW AND PROCEDURE (1964).
2 "The process of balancing conflicting interests is commonplace in many
areas of the law; in the law of eminent domain it is of primary importance
... [Tlhe process of arriving at a decision that is fair both to the public
and to private interests involves a careful weighing and balancing of these
interests." Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain - Policy and Concept, 42
CALIF. L. REv. 596, 626 (1954).
3 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
4 Id. at 326.
5 In other words, incidental or consequential damages suffered
by a person are not compensable rthis is true only in complete
taking cases - not in partial taking casesi. Loss of business is not
recoverable. Losses of future profits are not to be compensated.
[Vol. 74
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United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co.,6 the Supreme
Court stated that "[t]he owner must be compensated for what is
taken from him, but that is done when he is paid its fair market
value for all available uses and purposes."7 And in United States
v. Miller,8 the Court held the basis of the theory of just compensation
to be that an individual property owner should be placed in as good
a position financially as he would have been but for the condemna-
tion.9
An examination of West Virginia case decisions reveals similar
policy considerations. Generally, fair market value at the time of
the taking of the property is the compensation to which the owner
is entitled.1" In Wheeling Electric Co. v. Gist," the court defined
market value as the price for which the land could be sold in the
market by a person desirous of selling to a person wishing to buy,
both freely exercising prudence and intelligent judgment as to its
value, and unaffected by compulsion of any kind. The landowner
is entitled to compensation for the highest and best use of the land. 2
In State Road Commission v. Board of Commissioners,3 the court
declared that the guiding principle of just compensation in a con-
demnation proceeding is reimbursement to the landowner for the
Business interruption, expenses in substituting other real property,
cost of appraisals and surveys, losses because of forced sale by rea-
son of a taking, and losses of rental income rexcept where capitali-
zation method is usedi, of good will, of a going concern, and of
employment are all considered incidental. S. SEARLEs, A PRACTcAL
GumE TO THE LEGAL AND APPIRAIsAL Asx'EcI Op CONDEMNATION 187
(Joint Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the American
Law Institute and the American Bar Association 1969).
6 229 U.S. 53 (1913).7 /d. at 81. "Market value is value, not to an ordinary buyer or seller,
but to a prudent buyer and seller. It is a price arrived at by a willing buyer
and seller, obtained in the open market, in the regular course of competition."
S. SEARLES, supra note 5, at 188. See also Guyandotte Valley Ry. v. Buskirk,
57 W. Va. 417, 50 S.E. 521 (1905); 4 P. NIcHOLs, supra note 1, at § 12.2(1)
(2). A further refinement of the basic definition of market value was given
by the court in Strouds Creek & Muddlety R.R. v. Herold, 131 W. Va. 45,
45 S.E.2d 513 (1947). In that case the court indicated that consideration
should be given to every element of value which ordinarily arises in nego-
tiations between private persons with respect to the voluntary sale and pur-
chase of land, the use made of the land at the time a part of it is taken, its
suitability for other uses, its adaptability for every useful purpose to which
it may be reasonably expected to be immediately devoted, and the most ad-
vantageous uses to which it may be applied.
8 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
9 1d. at 373.10 Guyandotte Valley R.R. v. Buskirk, 57 W. Va. 417, 50 S.E. 521 (1905).
"173 S.E.2d 336 (W. Va. 1970).
'2 Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Davis, 58 W. Va. 620, 52 S.E. 724 (1906).
13 173 S.E.2d 919 (W. Va. 1970).
3
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land taken. A landowner is entitled to be put in as good a position
pecuniarily as if his land had not been taken. In addition, the court
said the proper measure of damages is the landowner's loss and not
the condemnor's gain." Ordinarily the cost of a substitute facility
is not the proper measure of damages, but the courts have allowed
this deviation from the general rule when the condemnee was a
government unit and was required by law to provide the substitute
facility.15
It is evident from the foregoing decisions that a displaced
landowner is entitled to compensation equal to the market value of
the real estate he is forced to relinquish to the government. There are
three judicially acceptable approaches to market value: (1) com-
parable sales, 6 (2) capitalization of income," and (3) cost. 8
A. Comparable Sales
The comparable sales approach is essential in almost every
determination of the value of real property. It produces an estimate
of the value of a specific tract of property by comparing it with
similar properties of the same type and class sold recently in the
same or competing areas. 9 The degree of comparability depends
upon many factors, including location, construction, age, condition,
layout, and the existence of fixed equipment.2" Normally, the sale
prices of comparable properties provide a range in which the value
of the subject property will fall. Four categories of data are basic to
the comparable sales approach and apply regardless of the type of
property under consideration: (1) sales or asking prices of com-
parable properties; (2) conditions influencing each sale; (3) location
of each property; and (4) description of land and improvements on
each property.'
141d. at 925.
15 See State Rd. Comm'n v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 173 S.E.2d 919 (W. Va.
1970); State Rd. Comm'n v. Penndel Co., 147 W. Va. 505, 129 S.E.2d 133
(1963).
16 The comparable sales approach is often referred to as the market data
approach.
,7 The capitalization of income approach is sometimes referred to as
the income approach, or occasionally as the economic approach.18 Rarely used, the cost approach is sometimes referred to as the sum-
mation approach.19 See State Rd. Comm'n v. Ferguson, 148 W. Va. 742, 137 S.E.2d 206
(1964); 5 P. NCrsOLs, EmFNT DomAiN § 21.3 (rev. 3d ed. 1969).20 1d.
21 S. SEaRLms, supra note 5, at 365, 366.
(Vol. 74
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 74, Iss. 3 [1972], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol74/iss3/8
STUDENT NOTES
A prior sale of the property involved is admissible, provided
the sale was recent, voluntary, and between parties capable and
desirous of protecting their interests, and no change in conditions
or market fluctuation in values has occurred since the sale.22 The
price paid for the land by the owner is admissible evidence of its
value, provided the purchase was not remote in time from the
appropriation. 3 Offers made by the condemnor to the condemnee
are in the nature of an attempt to compromise and cannot be intro-
duced into evidence. 4 Prior offers of purchasers are generally held
inadmissible;" however, a West Virginia case permitted the introduc-
tion of such evidence. 6 Sales of land similar to the land taken, made
voluntarily at or about the time of the taking, are admissible as
independent evidence of the value of the land taken.2" Forced sales
are not admissible because they are not voluntary and do not
reflect market value.2" Settlements made between the condemnor
and owners of neighboring lands in condemnation proceedings are
generally held to be inadmissible; 9 however, this does not appear to
be the West Virginia position."
B. Capitalization of Income
The capitalization of income method requires the employment
of an expert real estate appraiser. This approach, which is often
applied to rental property, involves the mathematical capitalization of
income from the property but not income from a business conducted
upon the property. 1
22 4 P. NicnoLs, supra note 1, at § 12.311(1).2 3 Guyandotte Valley R.R. v. Buskirk, 57 W. Va. 417, 50 S.E. 521
(1905).
24 Gauey & E. Ry. v. Conley, 84 W. Va. 489, 100 S.E. 290 (1919);
Mci ms JuR. Eminent Domain § 88 (1949).
2514 P. NIcHoLS, supra note 1, at § 12.311 (2).
2
6 Fox v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 34 W. Va. 466, 12 S.E. 757 (1890). The
West Virginia Court held: "lit is not improper to hear evidence of its ren-
tal value or of an offer to purchase" Id. at 467, 12 S.E. at 757 (emphasisadded).a 7 4 P. NicHoLs, supra note 1, at § 12.311(3); Virginia Power Co. v.
Brotherton, 90 W. Va. 155, 110 S.E. 546 (1922).
28 4 P. NicHoLs, supra note 1, at § 12.3113(1).
29 4 P. NicHoLs, supre note 1, at § 12.3113(2).
3 In United Fuel Gas Co. v. Allen, 137 W. Va. 897, 75 S.E.2d 88 (1953),
and Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Bonafield's Heirs, 79 W. Va. 287, 90 S.E. 868
(1916). it was held that the price voluntarily paid by the condemnor to
another landowner for land similarly situated was proper evidence to be con-
sidered by the jury where damages to the residue were not involved.
31 Evidence of business income or profit is inadmissible. For example,
income from a garage, a laundry, a restaurant, etc., would be inadmissible
because this is income from a business conducted upon the property. Rental
income, on the other hand, is admissible because it is income from the pro-
perty. 4 P. NicHoLs, supra note 1, at § 12.3121.
5
Graham: Eminent Domain: Approaches to Valuation of Real Estate with Empha
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1972
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
In using the capitalization approach, the appraiser is con-
cerned with the present worth of the future income potential
of the property, which is generally measured by the net income
a fully informed person is warranted in assuming the property
will produce during its remaining useful life.32 This net income is
capitalized into a value estimate after comparison with investments
of a similar type and class. The controlling factor is the rate at which
income is capitalized. A slight variation in the capitalization rate
can make a large difference in the capitalized value of the income.
For example, the difference between an annual income of $27,500
capitalized at 5 percent and at 5 percent is $50,000."2 In contrast,
smaller fluctuations result if different gross income estimates are
used. An increase of 10 percent in the gross income estimate will
only result in an increase of 10 percent in the land-value estimate. 4
The overall capitalization rate is derived from sales of com-
parable properties in the open market. 5 By computing the annual
net income of comparable properties and dividing by their sale prices,
an overall rate is obtained. This overall rate is applied to the annual,
net income of the subject property to arrive at a value determination,
Le., the value of the property equals its annual net income divided by
the overall capitalization rate. The lower the capitalization rate the
higher the value; and conversely, the higher the capitalization rate
the lower the value. 6 Naturally, the condemnor seeks a high
capitalization rate, while the landowner wants a low capitalization
rate.
When using the capitalization approach to ascertain the value
of rental property the appraiser's work may be classified into four
broad categories:
1. Obtaining the rent schedules and the percentage of oc-
cupancy for the subject property and comparable properties
for the current year and for several years in the past.
This information provides gross rental data and the trend
in rentals and occupancy. This data is then related and
32 S. SEARL , supra note 5, at 366.
33 BISHOP, Condemnation Trial Techniques On Behalf of Condemnor
and Condemnee, in CONDEMNATION 314 (Joint Committee on Continuing
Legal Education of the American Law Institute and the American Bar Asso-
ciation 1971).
34 Cf. id.3 5 d. at 316.3 6 1d.
[Vol. 74
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adjusted by the comparative method to ascertain the
estimate of gross income which the subject property should
produce to attract investors in the market.
2. Obtaining expense data such as taxes, insurance, and
operating costs being paid by the subject property and by
comparable properties. The trend in these expenses is also
necessary.
3. Estimating the remaining useful economic life of the
building to establish the probable duration of its income.
4. Selecting the appropriate capitalization rate and the ap-
plicable technique and method for processing the net
income.3"
Capitalization of hypothetical income is generally rejected by
the courts because of uncertainty and speculation.38 Likewise, past
profits derived from the business conducted on the property are
inadmissible because of uncertainty. 9 Where property is rented
for the use to which it is best adapted, the actual rent reserved
(annual net income) is capitalized at the rate which local custom
adopts for the purpose; this provides one of the best tests of
value and such evidence should be admitted.4" Evidence of actual
rental value is admissible.4'
C. Cost
When using cost analysis appraisers combine two estimates to
arrive at a final value determination: (1) an estimate of the land's
value, and (2) an estimate of the depreciated reproduction cost of
buildings and other improvements located upon the land.42 De-
preciation, an extremely controversial issue, consists of physical
deterioration as well as functional and economic obsolescence. The
cost approach requires compliance with four steps: (1) the
estimate of the land's value as if vacant (use comparable sales data);
37 S. SEAimLs, supra note 6, at 366.
38 4 P. NicHoLs, supra Note 1, at § 12.3121(3).
39 Gauley & E. Ry. v. Conley, 84 W. Va. 489, 100 S.E. 290 (1919).
404 P. NicHoLs, supra note 1, at § 12.3122.
41 Fox v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 34 W. Va. 466, 12 S.E. 757 (1890).
42 In a condemnation proceeding in which land improved with a build-
ing was taken evidence of the reproduction cost of the building, less proper
deductions for depreciation, was admissible as an element of the market value
of the land. Chesapeake, & 0. Ry. v. Johnson, 134 W. Va. 619, 60 S.E.2d 203
(1950); accord, State Rd. Comm'n v. Milam, 146 W. Va. 368, 120 S.E.2d
254 (1961).
7
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(2) the estimate of the current cost of reproducing the existing
improvements; (3) the estimate and deduction of depreciation from
all causes; and (4) the addition of the land's value and the de-
preciated reproduction cost of improvements.4"
One or more of these three approaches may apply to a parti-
cular situation, depending on the nature of the property involved.
The comparable sales approach normally applies whereas capitaliza-
tion and cost approaches apply less frequently. If possible, an
appraiser will attempt to apply and correlate all three approaches as
an aid to a more precise evaluation of true value. Due to space
limitations, examples could not be given in this article; however,
reference material is available to anyone interested in acquiring a
thorough knowledge of the mechanics of these three approaches to
value.
44
D. Special Problem Areas
1. Partial Taking: Damages in partial taking cases are
measured by the market value of the land actually taken, plus
diminution in market value of the residue, less all benefits which will
accrue as a result of the public work to be constructed.4' Benefits
may be set off against damages to the residue, but not against
the value of the part taken.46 The constitutional right of a state to
permit a deduction for general benefits is summarized in McCoy v.
Union Elevated Railroad Co.," as follows:
And we are unable to say that he suffers deprivation
of any fundamental right when a State goes one step
further and permits consideration of actual benefits
4 3 S. SEARLES, supra note 6, at 365.44 Examples of the three approaches appear in S. SEARLES, supra note 6,
at 370, where M.A.I. appraiser Gerald Schmitz applies each approach to one
factual situation in a detailed mathematical manner.4
SState Rd. Comm'n v. Evans, 131 W. Va. 744, 50 S.E.2d 485 (1948);
State Rd. Comm'n v. Snider, 131 W. Va. 650, 49 S.E.2d 853 (1948); Strouds
Creek & Muddlety R.R. v. Herold, 131 W. Va. 45, 45 S.E.2d 513 (1947). It
is noteworthy that a New York court would not allow the capitalization ap-
proach to be used in a partial taking situation. Levitin v. State, 12 App. Div.
2d 6, 207 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
46State Rd. Conm'n v. Evans, 131 W. Va. 744, 50 S.E.2d 485 (1948);
State Rd. Comm'n v. Snider, 131 W. Va. 650, 49 S.E.2d 853 (1948); Strouds
Creek & Muddlety R.R. v. Herold, 131 W. Va. 45, 45 S.E.2d 513 (1947);
State v. Sanders, 128 W. Va. 321, 36 S.E.2d 397 (1945); W. VA. CoDE ch.
54, art. 2, § 9 (Michie 1966). See also Note, Right To Set-Off Benefits
Against Damages to Property In Eminent Domain Proceedings, 46 W. VA. L.
REv. 320 (1940).
47 247 U.S. 354, 366 (1918).
[Vol. 74
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enhancement in market value - flowing directly from a
public work, although all in the neighborhood receive like
advantages. In such case the owner really loses nothing
which he had before; and it may be said with reason, there
has been no real injury. 8
It is proper to award incidental or consequential damages in
partial taking cases. Compensation covers past, present and prospec-
tive damages to the residue that are the natural, necessary or reason-
able incidents of the work to be performed, assuming such damages
are capable of ascertainment at the time of the taking. "9 Hence, it
is proper to consider the nature of the improvement, the manner
in which it is made, the character of the tract of which a part is
taken, the situation of the part with reference to the residue, the
general effect of the improvement on the severance of the tract, and
the expenses the owner may encounter in preserving the property
from further damage (such as the cost to build a fence).
2. Leasehold Estates: If the entire tract under a lease is taken
the tenant's liability to pay rent terminates unless the lease provides
otherwise.5 ' Likewise, where only a part of the leased property
is taken the tenant's rent must be reduced in the proportion that the
value of the land or interest taken bears to the total value of the
land, absent a contrary provision in the lease.52 A tenant may
recover the value of his lease in a condemnation proceeding if that
value exceeds the amount of the rent which he is relieved from
paying.53 Statutory provisions require that the condemnor allege in
the petition "any liens upon or conflicting claims to . . ." the land,
so far as are known,54 and that the condemnor give ten days notice
to all "owners, claimants and persons holding liens, whose interests
the applicant seeks to condemn. . . .-I In the event of a temporary
48 Id. at 366.
49See State Rd. Comm'n v. Evans, 131 W. Va. 744, 50 S.E.2d 485
(1948); Monongahela Valley Traction Co. v. Windom, 78 W. Va. 390, 88
S.E. 1092 (1916).
50 Id.
5' W. VA. CODEc h. 37, art. 6, § 29 (Michie 1966).
52Id.
53 United States v. Alderson, 49 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. W. Va. 1943); Mil-
burn By-Products Coal Co. v. Eagle Land Co., 141 W Va. 866, 93 S.E.2d
231 (1956). See also Kizer, Valuation of Leasehold Estates In Eminent
Domain, 67 W. VA. L. Rnv. 101 (1965); 60 W. VA. L. Rav. 384 (1958).
S4 W. VA. CODE ch. 54, art. 2, § 2 (Michie 1966).
55 W. VA. CODE ch. 54, art, 2, § 3 (Michie 1966).
9
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taking of a leasehold estate, courts permit moving costs to be
recovered by the lessee.56
3. Easements: The measure of just compensation payable for
a flowage easement is the value of the easement to its owner, exclusive
of any value attributable to water power or hydroelectric uses of the
land.5" The right of direct access to and from a public highway is a
property right of which an abutting landowner cannot be deprived
without just compensation." However, damages may not be re-
covered by owners of property which does not abut upon a highway
after relocation of such highway if reasonable access is otherwise
provided. 9
When the condemnor acquires an easement across the owner's
land the measure of just compensation is the market value of the
easement taken, plus the difference in market value of the residue
of the owner's land not occupied by the easement immediately before
and immediately after the taking, less all benefits accruing to such
residue from the improvement to be constructed.6 When the
condemnor has previously acquired an easement over the same
tract, the value of the interests previously acquired and paid for must
be deducted.6"
4. Moving and Relocation Expenses: As a general rule, a land-
owner is not entitled to compensation for the cost of moving personal
property from the premises.62 A West Virginia statute enacted in
1963 authorized the state highway department to pay "relocation
costs to persons dislocated by highway construction. . ." provided that
"[p]ayments shall not exceed two hundred dollars in the case of a
family or an individual, or three thousand dollars in the case of
a business concern (including the operation of a farm) or nonprofit
organization .... "63
56United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
57 United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1961).5 8State ex reL Ashworth v. State Rd. Comm'n, 147 W. Va. 430, 128
S.E.2d 471 (1962).
19 State ex rel. Wiley v. State Rd. Comm'n, 148 W. Va. 76, 133 S.E.2d
113 (1963).6 0 Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Fox, 134 W. Va. 106, 58 S.E.2d
584 (1950).
61 Virginia Elec. and Power Co. v. Patterson, 204 Va. 574, 132 S.E.2d
436 (1963).
62 Gauley & E. Ry. v. Conley, 84 W. Va. 489, 100 S.E. 290 (1919);
Annot, 69 A.L.R.2d 1453 (1960).
63 W. VA. CoDE ch. 17, art. 2A, § 20 (Michie 1966).
[Vol. 74
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By studying applicable statutes West Virginia lawyers can gain a
working knowledge of condemnation procedure. Value deter-
mination, however, is a much more challenging proposition. No
two properties are alike and human value judgments change with the
passage of time. Appropriately, in Application of Port Authority
Trans-Hudson Corp.," the Supreme Court of New York noted:
If analogy is found in Newton's experiment with prisms
showing that white light is composed of all the colors of the
spectrum, each lending its own characteristics to a degree
when passed through a prism, all approaches to valuation
entering into the informed mind and sensitive conscience of
the court lend to an appropriate degree in the resulting
decision."
II. MINERAL PROPERTIES - THE SEPARATE VALUATION PROBLEM
A. The West Virginia Position
In 1947, Judge Haymond, in Strouds Creek & Muddlety Rail-
road Co. v. Herold,66 set forth the West Virginia position with
respect to the admissibility of evidence of separate valuations of
timber and mineral deposits in arriving at the total market value of
condemned land. The controlling language of that opinion was as
follows:
To establish the value of the land, the presence of crops,
trees, shrubs and timber upon it and of coal, oil, gas, stone
and other minerals and valuable deposits upon or under the
surface may be shown.... Consideration, however, should
be confined to the land and its contents and elements
together and as an entirety when there is no separate owner-
ship with respect to any of them... Compensation for land
should be ascertained and determined on the basis of its
value at the time it is taken or damaged. All of its com-
ponents may be considered in arriving at the value of the
unit, the land itself, but none of them, when not separately
owned, may be given an independent value apart from the
land as land.6"
64 48 Misc. 2d 485, 265 N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
65 48 Misc. 2d at -, 265 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
66 131 W. Va. 45, 45 S.E.2d 513 (1947).
67 Id. at 60-61, 45 S.E.2d at 523.
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It is noteworthy that in Strouds Creek the court implied that
it would have allowed evidence of separate valuations if there had
been separate ownership of the surface and mineral interests,6" or if
mining operations had been in existence, 9 or if there had been a
lease in existence.7"
B. Jurisdictions in Agreement with West Virginia Position
Judge Haymond relied primarily upon Pennsylvania and
Illinois cases"1 in support of the court's decision in Strouds Creek.
The courts of those two states have steadfastly maintained that
separate values of land and minerals are inadmissible to determine
market value. Searle v. Lackawanna and Bloomsburg Railroad Co., 2
decided in Pennsylvania in 1859, was the earliest case dealing with
condemnation of mineral properties in the United States. The rea-
soning of that decision is still followed in Illinois, and in Pennsylvania
except as modified by statute. In Searle, where it was held that no
recovery could be had for coal under the surface of land taken in
eminent domain by showing what income might be obtained from
the coal if it were mined, the court stated:
Though we might have the most accurate calculation of the
quantity of coal in the land, yet, without knowing exactly
the expense of bringing it to the surface and carrying it to
market, and the amount likely to be lost in mining and
conveying, and the times in which it would be brought out,
and the market prices at those times, the quantity would not
help us to value the land. The gross estimates of common
life are all that courts and juries have skill enough to use
as a measure of value. All other measures are necessarily
arbitrary and fanciful.73
611d. at 61, 45 S.E.2d at 523. This principle of law was recently con-
firmed in State v. Cooper, 152 W. Va. 309, 315-316, 162 S.E.2d 281, 285
(1968), where the court quoted 29A C.JS. Eminent Domain § 174 (1965)
with approval:
So where the mineral interest and the surface interest are owned by
different persons, the mineral interest may be valued separately, but
it must be valued as a segregated part of real property and not as a
natural warehouse for minerals as personal property.691 Id. at 62, 45 S.E.2d at 524.
70 Id. at 62, 45 S.E.2d at 524.
71 Id. at 61, 45 S.E.2d at 523.
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A 1971 Pennsylvania case, Whitenight v. Commonwealth,74 did
not deviate from earlier Pennsylvania decisions. In Whitenight the
court held that the condemnee could establish the quantity and
quality of mineral deposits under condemned land. He could not,
however, introduce in evidence the number of tons of minerals lost
and then multiply that number by some dollar figure such as market
price or royalty payment to establish the total loss. In a 1960
Pennsylvania case, Brown v. Commonwealth,75 the court declared
that the same rule applied to standing timber. However, the in-
stance of coal land condemned for a right of way for a highway
presents a statutory exception to the normal procedure for ascer-
tainment of damages in Pennsylvania. 6 A Pennsylvania statute
established the State Mining Commission as the sole arbiter in this
situation. The Commission is authorized to require coal, underlying
or adjacent to the highway, to be left in place for vertical or
lateral support, and to determine the damages due for such coal.
Any coal not required for support is not included in the award be-
cause it may be removed by the condemnee. But when the absolute
right of support is appropriated, the Commission has no jurisdiction
and normal procedures are followed.
Illinois courts have followed the Pennsylvania rule, but evidently
Illinois does not have a statutory exception to the rule in highway
cases. A 1969 Illinois case, Department of Public Works and
Buildings v. Oberlaender,7 provided that compensation for land
containing mineral deposits had to be estimated for land as land,
with all its capabilities, and if there was timber on it, or coal, oil
or other minerals under the surface, they were to be considered
so far as they affected the value of the land but they could not
be valued separately. flinois has consistently maintained this posi-
tion throughout the years.7 8
Apparently only Nebraska has given support to the West
Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Illinois views by way of court decision
74 1 Pa. Cmwlth. 144, 273 A.2d 752 (1971). See also Werner v. Com-
monwealth, 432 Pa. 280, 247 A.2d 444 (1968) (per Jones, J., with one
judge concurring and two judges concurring in result); Sqarlat Estate v.
Commonwealth, 398 Pa. 406, 158 A.2d 541 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
817 (1960).
75 399 Pa. 156, 159 A.2d 881 (1960).76 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 1501-07 (1954). For a discussion of this
statute see Kerry v. Commonwealth, 381 Pa. 242, 113 A.2d 254 (1955);
Union Collieries Co. Appeal, 345 Pa. 531, 29 A.2d 26 (1942).
77 42 Ill. 2d 410, 247 N.E.2d 888 (1969).
78 See Illinois Bldg. Auth. v. Dembinsky, 233 N.E.2d 38 (Ill. App. 1967);
Forest Preserve Dist. v. Caraher, 299 Il. 11, 132 N.E. 211 (1921).
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in the last ten years. In a 1970 Nebraska case, Iske v. Omaha Public
Power District,9 the court held that evidence of the quantity and
quality of mineral deposits could be shown but the award could
not be reached by separately valuing the land and the deposits
because that would entail too much speculation.
C. Jurisdictions in Opposition to West Virginia Position
Numerous jurisdictions now allow evidence of separate values
of minerals and land to go to the jury if certain qualifications and
safeguards are recognized and followed. In a recent Texas case,
Brazos River Authority v. Gilliam,"° the court reached a decision
that was opposite to the West Virginia decision in Strouds Creek. The
Texas court held that it was proper to consider a mathematical
formula to determine the value of gravel in place, and to take such
value along with value of the land in other respects into consideration
to arrive at the ultimate conclusion of correct value. This decision
was made despite the fact that no gravel operations had ever been
conducted and despite lack of evidence that gravel operations would
be conducted within a reasonable time. Although other jurisdictions
have allowed evidence of separate valuations of minerals in con-
demnation proceedings, none are more liberal in admitting such
evidence than was the Texas court in Brazos River Authority.
In Consumers Power Co. v. Allegan State Bank,"' the Michigan
court, with the aid of a statute, 2 decided that the property rights
to be considered in awarding just compensation for taking interests
in land necessary to establish a gas storage field were title to the
minerals, all rights to the formations, and rights to the surface; and
such rights were to be considered as separate and distinct uses in
awarding just compensation. In a similar but distinguishable case,
Mackie v. Green," a Michigan court held that where the right to
remove minerals was condemned their value in place must be
established to fix the damage, and it was not necessary to establish
that a market (warranting commercial exploitation of the materials)
existed.
79 185 Neb. 724, 178 N.W.2d 633 (1970). See also Iske v. Metropolitan
Util. Dist. of Omaha, 183 Neb. 34, 157 N.W.2d 887 (1968).
80429 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
81 20 Mich. App. 720, 174 N.W.2d 578 (1969).
82 Mich. Stat. Ann. § 22.1672 (cum. supp. 1969).
83 5 Mich. App. 583, 147 N.W.2d 427 (1967). In addition, see Michigan
State Highway Comm'n v. McLaughlin, 16 Mich. App. 22, 167 N.W.2d 468
(1969), in which the court held that the measure of damages was the value of
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Federal courts, in general, have allowed separate valuations of
minerals in place, especially if a foundation has been laid establish-
ing the existence of a market for the material, the going price on the
market, and the foreseeability of the future of that market.8 4 In
United States v. 237,500 Acres of Land,8" the court held that
evidence of the value of minerals in place, less transportation andmining costs - given a proper foundation regarding a market for the
minerals - could be considered as a factor in determining the value
of the property. The Eighth Circuit used similar reasoning in
Mills v. United States8 in holding that the value of minerals in place
was a factor to be considered in an eminent domain proceeding,
but the court emphasized that there had to be more than mere
theoretical future demand and use. There had to be some objective
support for the future demand, including volume and duration.
Taking a slightly different approach in United States v. 180.37
Acres of Land,8" a federal district court in Virginia held that a land-
owner was entitled to the highest and most profitable use to which
the land was adaptable, and that where there was no evidence of
comparable sales of condemned timberland in which there was coal,
a determination of the value of the property on the basis of a mini-
mum royalty per ton of the coal as calculated by a qualified and
experienced engineer together with evidence of the surface value
was proper. In United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Cattarau-
gus County,88 the court decided that the "unit rule" was no legal im-
84 See United States v. Sowards, 370 F.2d 87 (10th Cir. 1966); United
States v. Whitehurst, 337 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1964); United States v. 237,500
Acres of Land, 236 F. Supp. 44 (S.D. Cal. 1964). Condemnation of pro-
perty in federal courts is governed by Rule 71A of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rule 71A(h) deals with the method of trial in an action in-
volving the federal power of eminent domain; Rule 71A(k) governs when the
state power of eminent domain is invoked in a federal court. State substantive
law is not applied when the federal power is invoked, but when the state
power is invoked in a federal court under Rule 71A(k) the "intent is to
follow state law .... " 5 J. MooRE, FEDE AL PRAcrIcE §38.12 r51 (2d ed.
1948). Rule 71A(k) has the effect of avoiding any question as to whether
the decision in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and later cases have application to con-
demnation where the state power is invoked in federal courts. When the fed-
eral power is invoked the law of evidence in federal courts favors a broad
rule of admissibility and is designed to permit the admission of all evidence
which is relevant and material to the issues in controversy, unless there is a
sound and practical reason for excluding it. FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a); United
States v. 60.14 Acres of Land, 362 F.2d 660 (3d Cir. 1966).85236 F. Supp. 44 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
86 363 F.2d 78 (8th Cir. 1966). Here, the court did not allow evidence
of value based upon the tons in place times the prospective royalty because the
landowner had failed to lay a proper foundation.87 254 F. Supp. 678 (W.D. Va. 1966).
88 327 F. Supp. 181 (W.D.N.Y. 1970).
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pediment to a consideration of the value of the timber and soil as
proper evidence of the total market value of the property. A similar
decision was reached in McLemore v. Alabama Power Co., 9 where
it was held that the condemnee had a right to show the value of
timber and pulpwood on the land taken.
Recent decisions in Washington and Louisiana also indicate a
more liberal trend in admitting evidence of the value of minerals in
place. In State v. Hobart,0 the court found that the condemnee's
value testimony was not inadmissible on the theory that she violated
the rule that value cannot be computed by multiplying an assumed
number of yards of material by a price per unit, where her entire
testimony reflected that her overall valuation was based upon other
factors in addition to quantity and unit price, and her estimate of
value was less than it would have been had she merely estimated the
unit value of rock in place by the number of cubic yards of rock con-
tained in the condemned site. A similar decision was reached in
State v. Hart,9 where evidence of the value of minerals underlying
the land was held admissible, but the court stressed that the proper
measure of damages was the per acre value of the land considering
its mineral content.
In Dow v. State,92 a 1967 New Hampshire case, the court
decided that evidence of the value of mineral deposits in place was
proper and admissible as a factor to be considered by the jury in
determining damages based on the highest and best use of the con-
demned property, but only if such evidence was accompanied by
proper safeguarding instructions. This was essentially the same
position that was taken by the Fourth Circuit in United States v.
Wise,93 a 1942 case in which the court found no error by the trial
judge in admitting evidence of the reproduction cost of structural
improvements, and the replacement cost of trees, shrubs, etc., where
the trial judge had repeatedly instructed the jury that such evidence
was admitted solely to aid them in determining the fair market
value of the property, but that it would be improper to simply add
up the separate values to determine just compensation. The instruc-
tions given by the trial judge contained the following language:
89 285 Ala. 20, 228 So. 2d 780 (1969).
905 Wash. App. 469, 487 P.2d 635 (1971).
91 249 So. 2d 310 (La. 1971).
92 107 N.H. 512, 226 A.2d 92 (1967).
93 131 F.2d 851 (4th Cir. 1942).
[Vol. 74
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[Y]ou are to keep in mind that fair market value is not
to be ascertained by saying the buildings on the land are
worth so much, the shrubs so much, . . . and all the
different elements (the power line and such as that), and
then say we will add them all up and that is just compensa-
tion. But... you are to consider every physical fact and
circumstance and everything that is on the land and under
the land that has been added to it, for the purpose of
arriving at a final figure, which in your opinion, based upon
all the evidence, will be just compensation for the single
piece of property taken. That is to say, this is not to be
viewed as separate takings of the soil, shrubbery, and
buildings, but it is to be viewed as the taking of a single
piece of property.94
An analysis of the foregoing decisions discloses a more
liberal trend in the courts toward admitting evidence of the separate
values of mineral deposits and timber, especially where a foundation
is laid establishing a market for the timber or minerals and safe-
guarding instructions warn the jury against the pitfall of simply
adding up the separate values to arrive at just compensation. This
trend is especially evident where comparable sales are not available
as evidence of the market value of the condemned property.
D. Conclusion and Proposal For Change in West Virginia Law
There are many reasons why courts across the country are
discarding the stringent restrictions first laid down in 1859 by the
Pennsylvania court in Searle v. Lackawanna and Bloomsburg Rail-
road Co.9" A prospective purchaser would want to know precisely
the type of information that the Searle rationale holds inadmissible,
i.e., an estimate of the quantity of timber or minerals available, the
current market price per unit, and the anticipated profits from a
given volume of sales: "[Tihe brute fact, often in evidence in the
valuation of a particular property, is that its income-producing
potential is the most important and key element which the buyer
and seller take into account in arriving at a fair price to be paid."96
94 Id. at 852.
95 33 Pa. 57 (1859).96 Campbell, Condemnation of Mining Properties - Related Aspects of
Just Compensation, 15 RocKy MouNTAN MNERAL LAW INST. 305, 321
(1969).
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In Strouds Creek & Muddlety Railroad Co. v. Herold,9 the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found such evidence
objectionable because it was based on speculation and conjecture.
This may have been a valid position to take in 1947, but its validity
is doubtful today. Great technological advances have been made in
the timber and mining industries since 1947. The quantity and
quality of coal, oil, and gas deposits can be determined through
exploratory drillings. Forestry specialists can estimate with great
accuracy the number of board feet of lumber available from a given
stand of timber. Similar information can be obtained by specialists
when the land contains limestone and sand deposits. Economic
experts can determine with a high degree of accuracy the available
markets and the probable profits of a given operation. And finally,
appraisal experts have greatly refined value determination techniques,
especially the capitalization of income approach.
The Strouds Creek court, in principle, would have allowed the
existence of timber and minerals to be shown, but would not allow
separate valuations of the timber and minerals. This position is no
longer tenable if scientific advancements since 1947 are taken into
consideration. To maintain such a position today would necessarily
result in the very evil that the Strouds Creek court sought to avoid,
i.e., jury awards based on speculation and conjecture. It would be
illogical to allow evidence of the presence of timber and minerals
to go to the jury and yet exclude detailed scientific valuation
testimony - the very type of information which a prospective
buyer would seek and could obtain - from knowledgeable experts
in their respective fields. If the jury is simply made aware of the
existence of timber and minerals, without more, it seems inevitable
that the final jury award will be the result of the most blatant
speculation and conjecture imaginable.
It is submitted that neither the old "unit rule" as enunciated by
the Searle and Strouds Creek courts, nor the simple addition of
separate valuations, sometimes called the "summation rule," is the
best method to utilize in arriving at just compensation when mineral
properties are condemned. A hybrid of these two methods would
provide a more rational rule, i.e., separate valuations of timber,
minerals, and the like, should be admissible as evidence provided
safeguarding instructions are given informing the jury that such
97 131 W. Va. 45, 45 S.E.2d 513 (1947).
[Vol. 74
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evidence may be considered as a factor in arriving at a final award,
along with other evidence, but that it is improper for the jury to
simply add the separate value estimates together in ascertaining just
compensation. Basically, this was the approach taken in State Road
Commission v. Evans,98 a 1948 West Virginia decision rendered
just one year after Strouds Creek. Although this case involved
residential property - not mineral property - and Strouds Creek
was not mentioned in the opinion, it seems that the following
language written by Judge Kenna should apply with equal force to
condemned mineral properties.
The range of relevant testimony in arriving at market
value varies according to the circumstances of each case
and, in the final analysis, rests largely within the discretion
of the trial judge. In some localities sales may be frequent:
in others rare. We believe, however, that in any event it
is not error to permit a witness to analyze the figure given
by him as the market value and in doing so to state his
opinion as to the value of the items going to make up the
whole. Consequently the cost of reconstructing the garage,
by itself and standing alone, would not have been properly
admitted as a distinct item of damages. However, as one
of the ingredients going to make up market value of
property taken, we believe that it was admissible. As a
separate element of recovery it should have been excluded,
but if used to sustain and bolster evidence of market
value given on behalf of the defendant, as here, we believe
that its proper relevance is inescapable .... 99
It is also submitted that continued adherence to the Strouds
Creek rule would be unnecessarily frustrating to landowners, trial
judges, and trial lawyers who live in a world that demands precise
and detailed information to the greatest extent possible.
The present West Virginia rule, although it may have been
warranted in the past, is simply unrealistic and unfair because it is
unjustifiably couched in general terms. Many centuries ago Aristotle
98 131 W. Va. 744, 50 S.E.2d 485 (1948).
99 Id. at 747, 50 S.E.2d at 486-87. The Evans court also allowed evidence
of the separate value of a Colorado blue spruce tree growing upon the resi-
dential land. Although the property involved in this case was not timber or
mineral property, per se, this case is subsequent in time to Strouds Creek and
it seems that the same principle should apply to timber and mineral properties.
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